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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of //2A-9/22/82 
CITY OF ALBANY, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5808 
-and-
LOCAL 1961, AFSCME COUNCIL 66, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
VINCENT J. McARDLE, JR., ESQ. (W. DENNIS DUGGAN, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
MICHAEL A. TREMONT, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local 1961, AFSCME, Council 
66, AFL-CIO (Local 1961) to a hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge 
that Leonard Decker was discharged by the City of Albany because he filed a 
grievance. The hearing officer determined that the evidence did not prove the 
charge. 
FACTS 
Decker had been an employee of the Street Department for about five 
years, having been promoted from laborer to sub-foreman.. At about 11:30 a.m. 
on October 29, 1981, two members of the staff of George Nealon, the Deputy 
Commissioner of Public Works of the City of Albany, reported to him that 
Decker had used the two-way radio to complain about his supervisor, during the 
course of which Decker had called his supervisor a stupid imbecile. At that 
time 
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there had been strict orders that the radio not be used for any but essential 
messages. Nealon testified that he found Decker's radio complaints 
objectionable both for their content and their nonessentiality. 
At about 3:00 p.m. that day Nealon spoke to Decker on the telephone. 
Decker told him that he had repaired a walk at the Palace Theater, which is 
operated by the City of Albany, but that his work had been ruined when some 
woman walked on the cement and that he would not repair it again. Nealon 
directed Decker to repair the walk again and then return to the garage. 
Decker returned to the garage without first repairing the walk. When he 
arrived, Nealon suspended him for three days. 
According to Nealon's testimony he told Harry Maikles, the Commissioner 
of Public Works, that the reason for the suspension was Decker's misuse of the 
radio but there are indications in the record that the Palace Theater incident 
also concerned him. When Local 1961 filed a grievance on behalf of Decker 
contesting the suspension, it mentioned only the radio incident. Nealon's 
response referred to the Palace Theater incident as well. 
Nealon, who was also the City official responsible for conducting 
grievance meetings in the Public Works Department, postponed the meeting on 
the grievance on two occasions at the request of the union. The meeting was 
finally held on December 3, 1981. Just before going into the meeting with the 
union, Nealon was handed a letter which Evelyn Knoll, the Director of the 
Palace Theater, had written to Maikles on November 20, 1981. That letter was 
a detailed account of the incident at the Palace Theater. It stated that 
Knoll had asked him to repair the walk and that Decker had responded in a rude 
manner, refused the request and blamed her for walking on the cement. 
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When the grievance meeting started, Local 1961 offered to prove that 
Decker's radio comments about his supervisor had not been abusive. Nealon did 
not let them do so. Instead, he questioned Decker and ascertained from him 
that he was not protected by CSL §75 and he fired Decker on the spot. Then, 
as required by the contract, he gave Local 1961 a written explanation of his 
discharge action. It stated: 
Mr. Leonard Decker was terminated by me effective 3 December 81. 
His overall work record, including absenteeism, tardiness and 
attitude were the main reasons, as well as his October 29 incident 
that serves as a metaphor for his inability to perform as a public 
servant. 
The record contains evidence that Nealon, acting in his capacity as the 
City's designee to resolve grievances in the Public Works Department, has 
resolved about 75 grievances, only one of which was sent to arbitration. 
Nealon, himself, was the object of the complaint in one of those grievances. 
On these facts, Local 1961 complained that Nealon fired Decker because 
Decker initiated the grievance. The filing of a grievance is a protected 
activity for which an employee may not be disciplined.— The hearing 
officer determined, however, that Decker was not discharged because he filed 
the grievance. 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, Local 1961 argues that the hearing officer erred in 
not concluding that Nealon had demonstrated animus toward Local 1961 and its 
leaders. In support of that exception, it points to testimony it introduced 
to show such animus. The hearing officer found that the evidence itself was 
not persuasive. Moreover, she found that its effect was diminished by the 
1/ State of New York (State University) , 12 PERB i[3009 (1979). 
77^2. 
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testimony of Frank Greco, an AFSCME field representative, given on 
cross-examination, that Nealon had been cooperative with AFSCME and had done 
an effective job in resolving grievances. 
Local 1961 also argues that the hearing officer erred in disregarding 
testimony that Nealon had admitted that he was firing Decker because Decker 
was pursuing the grievance. Nealon denied that he made such a statement, and 
his testimony was corroborated by a third person who was present at the 
meeting when it was allegedly made. The hearing officer credited the 
testimony of Nealon in this regard. 
Local 1961 makes several arguments in its exceptions and brief in support 
of its position that Nealon fired Decker because of the grievance and that 
the reasons given by Nealon were pretextual. It notes that Nealon"s 
after-the-fact written explanation for his discharge of Decker differs from 
the one given at the time of the discharge or in Nealon's testimony. It also 
notes that Knoll's letter does not refer to Decker by name. We consider that 
these circumstances provide no more than a basis for suspicion and surmise as 
to improper motivation, and that they are as consistent with Nealon's 
explanation of the discharge as with Decker's. The collective bargaining 
agreement required Nealon to provide Local 1961 with an explanation of the 
discharge, and it is not unusual that he used that opportunity to expand upon 
his dissatisfaction with Decker. As to the absence of any reference to 
Decker by name in Knoll's letter, it is clear that the employee complained 
about was Decker. 
Further, offsetting any possible inferences of impropriety is the 
testimony of Greco that Nealon had been cooperative with Local 1961 in the 
resolution of grievances generally and the fact that he readily granted 
postponements Local 1961 requested in the instant grievance. Moreover, there 
is no indication that Nealon developed or manifested prejudice against Decker 
«... 771 
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between the time Local 1961 filed the grievance and the time when he read 
Knoll's letter. We therefore conclude that there is not a sufficient basis 
in the circumstances relied upon by Local 1961 to conclude that Nealon 
discharged Decker because Decker filed a grievance. Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the hearing officer that Local 1961 did not prove its charge. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 22, 1982 
-7^e£^ rfL 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
%U, QU^ua^ 
Ida Klaus , Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
I '") , 
In the Matter of 
#2B-9/22/82 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 2, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5371 
-and-
DONAED-BARNETT7 
Charging Party. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
KENNETH M. AGELOFF, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of United Federation of 
Teachers, Local 2 (UFT) to a hearing officer's decision that it violated 
§209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law by issuing descriptions of a medical expense 
plan which were misleading in that they indicated incorrectly that only 
members of UFT were covered by it. In addition to its exceptions, UFT filed 
a motion with the hearing officer for the reopening of the record. As the 
motion was filed after the hearing officer issued his decision, it was 
transmitted to us for action. 
The matter also comes to us on the exceptions of Donald Barnett, the 
charging party, to so much of the hearing officer's decision as dismissed 
his allegation that persons who pay an agency shop fee to UFT, but are not 
members of it, are excluded from coverage under the plan. Barnett's 
exceptions further complain that the remedial order recommended by the 
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hearing officer is inadequate. That order directs UFT to amend the 
description of the plan and to post a notice of the amendment at locations 
where it normally posts notices to unit employees. He argues that posting 
is inadequate, only a direct mailing to agency shop fee payers and the 
inclusion of a notice in UFT's publication being sufficient. He also argues 
that the hearing officer erred in not awarding him attorney's fees. 
FACTS 
UFT represents teachers employed by the City School District of the 
City of New York. It has a special medical expense plan which reimburses 
covered persons for medical expenses that are not otherwise reimbursed under 
a major medical plan. The plan is financed out of its general fund, 
including income from agency shop fees. Describing this plan is a four-page 
brochure that bears the logo of UFT and the signature of Albert Shanker, its 
president, and Jules Kolodny, its secretary and assistant to the president. 
The brochure defines the term "participant" in the plan so as to identify 
participation with membership in UFT.— In addition, a document 
circulated among teachers in the New York City school system, bearing the 
signature of Mr. Shanker, lists benefits that accompany membership in UFT, 
referring, among other things, to group health insurance and free special 
medical insurance for catastrophic illness. 
1/ In its exceptions, UFT argues that the brochure had been used to 
describe the plan in the past but that there was no evidence in the 
record of its continued use. Neither is there any evidence in the 
record that it was withdrawn and the hearing officer correctly presumed 
continuing use. 
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Barnett is in the negotiating unit represented by UFT, but he is not a 
2/ 
member of that organization. He pays an agency shop fee.—' On February 
12, 1981 he filed a claim with UFT's welfare fund requesting reimbursement 
for certain medical expenses. The welfare fund reimbursed him for those 
expenses to the extent that they were covered by the fund and it transmitted 
the claim to UFT for determination whether he was entitled to further 
benefits under the UFT special medical expense plan. It informed Barnett of 
these actions in a letter dated March 17, 1981. In that letter, the 
welfare fund also told Barnett that he would receive additional payment from 
UFT if he were a member of UFT and meets the eligibility requirements of the 
special medical expense plan. Upon receipt of this letter from the welfare 
fund, Barnett telephoned a local office of UFT to ascertain whether he was 
an eligible beneficiary under the plan and he was told that only UFT members 
were eligible beneficiaries. He asked that this information be confirmed in 
writing, but he never received such a confirmation. 
On March 25, 1981, Barnett wrote to Dr. Kolodny asking whether he was 
an eligible beneficiary under the plan. On April 24, which was after the 
charge herein was filed but before it had been served upon UFT, Kolodny 
responded to Barnett informing him that he was covered by the plan. 
Thereafter, Barnett filed several claims with UFT for benefits under the 
plan and they were all paid. 
2/ In support of its motion to reopen the proceeding, UFT offered to prove 
that there were several periods of time between December 1977 and 
December 1981 that Barnett did not pay an agency shop fee to it. The 
offer of proof indicates, however, that he did pay such a fee from 
December 1980 through November 1981. Hence, UFT concedes that Barnett 
had made agency shop fee payments at all times relevant to the evidence 
underlying the charge herein. 
' .7757 
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DISCUSSION 
The primary basis of UFT's exceptions is that Barnett was without 
standing to bring the charge because he was not injured by UFT's conduct, 
all his claims under the plan having been paid. This argument is relevant 
only to so much of Barnett's charge as alleged that he was not covered by 
the medical expense plan, and the hearing officer dismissed that part of the 
charge. 
The allegation that agency shop fee payers were misled by UFT's 
description of the plan as applying to "members only" focuses on the 
inaccuracy of that description. It complains that the inaccurate 
i 
description had the effect of coercing employees to join UFT under the 
misapprehension that they would suffer a deprivation of benefits if they did 
not do so. No actual deprivation of benefits is required to establish such 
a violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Taylor Law. The mere inaccuracy of the 
description is coercive on its face in that it is sufficient to exert 
improper pressure upon all agency shop fee payers and, thus, any such unit 
employees had standing to bring the charge. Moreover, while Barnett did 
ascertain that he was covered by the plan, he was required to make a special 
inquiry to obtain that information. Had improper pressure not been placed 
upon him, he would not have been required to do so. 
Except for an allegation that the hearing officer considered evidence 
that was submitted after the closing of the record, UFT's other exceptions 
do not go to the merits of the hearing officer's decision. The complaint 
regarding the consideration of late evidence has no factual basis. It is 
that the Shanker letter should not have been considered by the hearing 
officer. That letter, however, was attached to Barnett's charge and was, 
therefore, part of the record. 
;•. 7758 
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In addition to dismissing UFT's exceptions, we also deny its motion to 
reopen the record. Its offer of proof contains an allegation that Barnett 
had been paid for several claims under the medical expense plan that he had 
filed at various times between September 1970 and October 1981. Proof of 
these allegations would, according to UFT, strengthen its claim that Barnett 
had no standing to present this charge because he knew of his coverage under 
the plan, notwithstanding UFT's description of it. The information upon 
which the offer of proof is based was in the possession of UFT and available 
to it at all times. Having failed to disclose that information between 
April 13, 1981 when the charge was filed and March 5, 1982 when the hearing 
officer issued his decision, it cannot be granted an opportunity to reopen 
the record and present that evidence at this late date. In any event, for 
the reasons stated, the evidence, even if accepted, would not affect our 
conclusion. 
In support of his exceptions, Barnett argues that the hearing officer 
was confused by the fact that his claims had been paid by UFT. He contends 
that this does not evidence his coverage under the plan, but merely reflects 
UFT's willingness to pay his claims in order to avert an unfavorable 
decision on the charge herein. Actual coverage under the plan is, according 
to Barnett, correctly described in UFT's brochure and Shanker's letter. 
This argument is not persuasive. There is no evidence in the record of a 
claim filed by Barnett or any other agency shop fee payer that was not 
honored by UFT. We therefore affirm the decision of the hearing officer 
that, although the descriptions of the plan are inaccurate, the agency shop 
fee payers are, in fact, covered by it. We also agree with his finding that 
the inaccurate and misleading character of the descriptions violates the 
right of unit employees to refrain from becoming members of UFT. 
. 775£ 
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Accordingly, we affirm his decision. We also accept his recommended 
3/ 
remedial order.— The notice proposed by him is sufficient and 
appropriate and as stated by him, "the circumstances of the case do not 
justify an award of attorney's fees . . . ." 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that UFT: 
1. Immediately amend the plan brochure to incorporate 
prominent notice that^The^plaE's" participants 
include nonmembers having an agency shop fee 
deduction taken, from their wage or salary and to 
incorporate this notice in any and all literature 
making reference to the plan which is prepared, 
published, or distributed hereafter; 
2. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining 
or coercing public employees in the exercise of 
their rights under the Act. 
3. Post the attached notice in all facilities at 
which unit employees work in locations at which 
_3/ In a footnote in his decision, the hearing officer indicated that the 
remedy should apply only so long as UFT chose to extend medical expense 
plan coverage to agency shop fee payers instead of reducing the amount 
of the agency shop fee commensurately. Since the issuance of his 
decision, a ruling of the Insurance Department has removed prior doubts 
that the plan could cover agency shop fee payers. Accordingly, the 
reservation contained in the hearing officer's decision is no longer 
relevant and UFT must cover agency shop fee payers under the plan. 
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information for unit employees is ordinarily posted and 
to which the UFT has access by contract, practice, or 
otherwise. 
Albany, New York 
September 22, 1982 
i€*6^7**^??, ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/ J ^ L - C ^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
i^^o 
David C. Randies, Member 
k< \T7VPJL 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify employees of the Board of Education of the City School District 
of the City of New York in negotiating units represented by the United 
Federation of Teachers, Local 2 (UFT) that the UFT will immediately amend the 
brochure describing the special medical expense plan (plan) to incorporate a 
prominent notice that the plan's participants include nonmembers of the UFT 
having ah agency shop fee deduction taken from their wage or salary and will 
incorporate this notice to all literature making reference to the plan which 
is prepared, published, or distributed hereafter. 
United Federation of Teachers, Local 2 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. ^ **)**} £.0 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTBURY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
ALBERT-HANDY-, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
WESTBURY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5425 
-and-
CATHERINE SENIUK, 
Charging Party. 
BOYD, HOLBROOK & SEWARD (JOHN G. LIPSETT, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Parties 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On May 11, 1981, Albert Handy and Catherine Seniuk (charging parties) 
each filed an improper practice charge alleging that the Westbury Teachers 
Association (Association) violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act in relation to its 
1978-79 agency shop refund because (a) the Association did not refund all 
monies due the charging parties and (b) the Association failed to provide 
adequate financial information regarding the refund. The Director dismissed 
#2C-9/22/82 
CASE NO. U-5424 
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these charges on the grounds that: (1) this Board has no jurisdiction to 
make a determination as to the correctness of the amount of the refund 
(Hampton Bays Teachers Association, 14 PERB |3018 (1981)); (2) this Board's 
decision in Westbury Teachers Association, 14 PERB 1|3063 (1981), dealing 
with the necessity of furnishing adequate financial information and 
-con-tinua±ion_of_the^ vj.olation_b^ ^ 
enforcement of our prior order; and (3) the instant charges were time-barred 
since they were filed more than four months after the complained of refund 
and failure to furnish information. 
In their exceptions to the Director's decision, the charging parties 
make two arguments, both of which were presented to and rejected by the 
Director. The first is that they could not have known that their cause of 
action ripened when they received the refund since this Board did not so 
hold until our decision in Hampton Bays Teachers Association, supra, on 
March 17, 1981, more than four months after the refund complained of by the 
charging parties. Their second argument is that by virtue of a statement in 
the Association's refund procedure, the Association is estopped from raising 
the "affirmative defense" of timeliness. Furthermore, since it is an 
"affirmative defense", the Director could not properly, as he did, raise the 
question on his own. 
We affirm the Director's decision dismissing these charges in their 
entirety. We do so because the charges were not filed within four months of 
the alleged improper conduct as required by §204.1(a)(i) of our Rules of 
Procedure. Our decision in UUP (Barry), 13 PERB 1f3090 (Nov. 11, 1980), made 
it clear that financial information must accompany the refund and that 
failure to do so constitutes an improper practice. Our decision in Hampton 
>; 7 7 6 4 
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Bays'merely restated that proposition in the context of a refund procedure 
without any appellate recourse. In Professional Staff Congress (Rothstein), 
15 PERB 113012 (1982), we reiterated that unions have been on notice since 
our UUP (Barry) decision of their obligation to furnish financial 
information at the time of refund. Such notice is equally applicable to 
agency—fee-payers-who-wish—to-proteet-their—rights.—Since—the—improper 
practice occurs, if at all, at the time of refund, the four-month limitation 
of our Rules begins to run at that time. 
In these cases, the Director properly exercised his authority under 
§204.2(a) of our Rules, which states that, "if it is determined that the 
facts as alleged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a violation, or that 
the alleged violation occurred more than four months prior to the filing of 
the charge, it should be dismissed by the Director . . . ." The lack of 
timeliness of these charges is apparent on their face. Section 204.7(1) of 
our Rules is intended to apply where such defect is not apparent when the 
Director processes a charge. That section reads: 
A motion may be made to dismiss a charge, or the hearing officer 
may do so at his own initiative on the ground that the alleged 
violation occurred more than four months prior to the filing of 
the charge, but only if the failure of timeliness was first 
revealed during the hearing. An objection to the timeliness of 
the charge, if not duly raised, shall be deemed waived. 
In adopting this language, we intended to clarify that a lack of 
timeliness did not deprive this Board of jurisdiction over the charge. On 
the other hand, we did not intend timeliness to be exclusively an 
affirmative defense of the respondent. Our four-month rule must be strictly 
applied. Thus, we retained both the Director's and the hearing officer's 
authority to raise the issue on their own initiative. 
776! 
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THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the charges herein be, and they hereby 
are, dismissed in their entirety. 
DATED: September 22, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
IdayJTSLaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WESTBURY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
#2D-9/22/82 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-5570 
ALBERT HANDY, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
WESTBURY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
-and-
CATHERINE SENIUK, 
Respondent, 
Charging Party. 
CASE NO. U-5573 
BOYD, HOLBROOK & SEWARD (JOHN G. LIPSETT, ESQ. 
of Counsel), for Charging Parties 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, ESQ.) 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions of the Westbury Teachers Association 
(Association) to the hearing officer's decision that the Association committed 
an improper practice in violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act when it failed to 
provide adequate financial information at the time Albert Handy and Catherine 
•Seniuk (charging parties) were given their agency fee refund for the 1979-80 
school year. 
eut 
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The material facts are as follows. On September 12, 1980, the charging 
parties requested a refund for the 1979-80 school year. On May 15, 1981, the 
Association remitted a refund of $2.13 purporting to cover refundable expenses 
of its affiliates, New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) and American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT). The Association stated that it had no refundable 
expenses. No financial data explaining the basis of the refund was given at 
t^hat timeT. On June T/T9"8T,_th^_lJhal^ili^palcTies appealed"the^efuncFpursuantT 
to the Association's refund procedure. The appeal was denied by the 
Association's executive board and "representative assembly" and the parties 
were so notified on June 23, 1981. This appears to have completed the 
appellate procedure. 
The Association construed a sentence in the charging parties' letter of 
June 3, 1981 as a request for financial information. Sometime in the first 
two weeks of July 1981, the Association sent the charging parties the 
financial information described in the hearing officer's decision. The 
information consisted of ledger entries of disbursements by the Association, 
audited financial statements of NYSUT and AFT and a one-page statement by 
NYSUT summarizing refundable expenses. The information did not include 
specific identification of refundable expenses. The charges herein were filed 
on July 10, 1981. 
The hearing officer (1) rejected the Association's contention that it was 
not obligated to furnish the information until requested to do so, (2) 
rejected its claim that the charge was mooted by the information furnished in 
July, and (3) agreed with the Association that he should not consider the 
adequacy of the July information since the charges do not raise that issue 
(but he indicated that he would conclude that a sufficient explanation of the 
refund was not given). He concluded that the Association committed an 
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improper practice when it failed to furnish financial information at the time 
when the charging parties were given their refunds for the 1979-80 school year. 
As the remedy for such violation, the hearing officer (1) directed the 
return of all agency fees paid by the charging parties during the 1979-80 
school year, together with interest from September 12, 1980 (the date the 
charging parties requested their refunds); (2) directed the return to them of 
ail-agenCy—fees-paid—during- the -1-9-&0—81— school—year,--together—with-Interest 
from the dates of payment; (3) directed the Association to cease collecting 
agency fees from the charging parties until such time as the Board should deem 
appropriate; and (4) directed the payment of the charging parties' reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in the prosecution of these proceedings. In 
fashioning this remedy, the hearing officer noted our previous order in 
Westbury Teachers Association, 14 PERB 3063 (1981). 
In its exceptions, the Association argues: (1) it never refused a request 
for financial information and promptly complied when such request was made; 
(2) the entire issue is academic since sufficient information has now been 
furnished; (3) the hearing officer exceeded his authority in ordering the 
return of all agency fees paid by the charging parties in 1979-80 and 1980-81, 
suspending the Association's right to collect agency fees from the charging 
parties and awarding them attorney's fees. In their response, the charging 
parties urge that the hearing officer's decision be affirmed in all respects. 
DISCUSSION 
We have previously held that adequate financial information must be 
' furnished at the time of refund and that failure to do so constitutes an 
improper practice in violation of §209-a.2(a) of the Act (UUP (Barry), 13 PERB 
j 1(3090 (1980)). We have also held that such information must be furnished to 
:'.. 7769 
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the objector whether or not a request for the information has been made. 
^ (Rothstein, 15 PERB 1(3012 (1982)). Where the failure to provide the required 
information occurred after our decision in UUP (Barry) (November 11, 1980) , we 
have imposed as a remedy a direction to return to a charging party all agency 
fees paid by that party for the year in question, together with interest from 
the date of refund. See PEF (Raterman), 15 PERB 1[3024; Goddard (Gates-Chili 
Teachers Association) , 15 PERB 113062 (1982). 
The hearing officer's remedy is more extensive than any we have heretofore 
found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. He was properly 
concerned by the fact that the Association was found to have committed the 
identical improper practice in connection with a prior year (Westbury Teachers 
Association (Handy) , 14 PERB 1(3063 (1981)). That decision was issued on 
August 20, 1981, after the events complained of in these cases. We there 
directed the Association to furnish the required information within 30 days, 
failing which, the Association would be required to return all agency fees for 
the year in question. 
The Association instituted an Article 78 proceeding to review our decision 
and order. Another proceeding was also instituted to review our decision and 
order in Hampton Bays Teachers Association, 14 PERB 1(3018 (1981). Thereafter, 
the attorneys for the two Associations cooperated with us in an effort to 
comply with our requirements. Both proceedings were withdrawn after we were 
satisfied that adequate financial information had been supplied to the agency 
fee payors. We accepted as compliance with our orders the furnishing of the 
following information: 
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1. As to Westbury Teachers Association, a financial statement signed by 
i 
its treasurer setting forth its income from all sources and a 
breakdown of its expenses into 10 major categories, together with 
"budget guidelines" which explain these categories. Since the 
Association concluded that it had no refundable expenses, all such 
reported expenses were considered non-refundable expenses. 
27 As~to NYSUT7 the agency~fee payors were "fur rTisKed^  audi ted- statements 
consisting of (a) balance sheet, (b) statement of operations and net 
worth, (c) statement of changes in financial position, (d) notes to 
financial statements, (e) statement of operating expenses, (f) 
statement of auditor identifying the specific line items in (e) which 
include the refundable expenses and the amounts thereof, and (g) a 
memorandum by its secretary-treasurer identifying the refundable 
\ expenses and indicating how the amount of the NYSUT refund was 
determined. 
3. As to AFT, the agency fee payors were furnished audited statements 
consisting of (a) balance sheet, (b) statement of income, expenses and 
fund balance, including general fund, defense fund and militancy fund, 
(c) notes to financial statements, (d) statement of expenses in 
general fund, (e) statement identifying specific line items in (d) 
which include refundable expenses and the amounts thereof, and (f) a 
memorandum of its secretary-treasurer based on (e), which indicates 
how the amount of the AFT refund was determined. 
We are advised that such information in the same form has been furnished 
to these charging parties for the 1979-80 school year as well, and that the 
Association will furnish such information in such form in the future to all 
) who request a refund. 
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In view of the uncertainties engendered by the timing of our decisions and 
) the pendency of the litigation, we do not believe the hearing officer's remedy 
in its entirety is necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act. 
In particular, we will not now order the suspension of the Association's 
agency shop fee privileges as to the charging parties nor shall we order the 
payment of attorney's fees. The hearing officer's direction to return the 
agency_fees_paid_for___the_19_a0-81__school__year__is_unwarra 
charges did not allege any improprieties with regard to the refund for that 
year. The same remedial order previously adopted by us in the PEF (Raterman) 
and Goddard cases is warranted for the violation found in these cases. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Westbury Teachers Association: 
1. to refund to Albert Handy and Catherine Seniuk the total amount of 
agency shop fees deducted from their salaries for 1979-80, with 
interest at the rate of 6% per-annum on this sum from May 15, 1981, 
the date when they received the agency shop refund, until June 25, 
1981, and at the rate of 9% per annum thereafter; and 
2. at the time of any future refund or notice that a refund will not be 
made, to furnish to all objectors an itemized audited statement of its 
receipts and expenditures and those of any of its affiliates which 
receive, either directly or indirectly, any portion of its revenues 
from agency fees, together with the basis of its determination of the 
amount of the refund, including identification of those disbursements 
determined by it and its affiliates to be refundable and those 
determined not to be refundable. Should it fail to do so, it shall 
refund to objectors all agency shop fees collected from them during 
the year for which the refund was applicable. 
i £ £ As 
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3. to post a copy of the notice attached hereto on all bulletin boards 
regularly used by it to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 22, 1982 
larold R. Newman, Chairman 
/C$t-As^4^-' 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify unit employees that: 
We will, at the time of making agency shop fee refunds, furnish together 
with those refunds, an itemized, audited statement of our receipts and 
disbursements, and those of any of our affiliates receiving any portion 
of their revenues from agency fees or dues, such statement to indicate 
the basis of the determination of the amount of refund, including 
identification of those disbursements of the Association and its affili-
ates that are refundable and those that are not. 
.WESTBURY .TEACHERS ASSOCIATION 
Employee Organization 
Dated. By. 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATION BOARD 
In the Matter of #2E-9/22/82 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 832, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5735 
-and-
COUNTY OF NIAGARA, 
Charging Party. 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESQS. (STEPHEN J. WILEY, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
EARL C. KNIGHT, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Niagara County (County) to 
a hearing officer's dismissal of its allegation that Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 832 (CSEA) refused to negotiate in good faith in that it 
would not remove a tape recorder from a room in which negotiations were 
taking place.— ' 
Niagara County and CSEA commenced negotiations on September 15, 1981. 
At that time CSEA proposed, as a ground rule, that tentative agreements be 
reduced to writing and be initialed by each side. The County rejected this 
1/ The hearing officer also dismissed the other allegations contained in 
the County's charge, but no exception were filed with respect to that 
action. Similarly, no exceptions were filed by CSEA to the hearing 
officer's dismissal of its charge in a related case that had been 
consolidated for decision by the hearing officer. 
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proposal, and at the following session, which was held on October 2, 1981, 
CSEA recorded the negotiations. The tape recorder was left on the table in 
full view of all present, but it was not noticed by the County. 
At the third negotiating session, which was held on October 6, 1981, 
the tape recorder was again left in full view of all the parties. It was 
noticed by the County representatives after about an hour had passed and 
they objected to it. They demanded that the recorder be physically removed 
from the room. As CSEA did not remove it promptly, the County's negotiators 
left the room. 
At the next negotiating session, which was held on October 16, 1982, 
CSEA again came with its tape recorder. Once again, the County's 
negotiators demanded that it be removed from the room and when CSEA did not 
remove it, they started to leave. While they were leaving, CSEA offered to 
turn the tape recorder off, but this did not satisfy the County and its 
negotiators left. 
Citing Town of Shelter Island, 12 PERB 1|3112 (1979) and NLRB v. 
Bartlett-Collins Co., 639 P 2d 652 (10th Cir., 1981), 106 LRRM 2272, cert, 
den. 452 US 961, 107 LRRM 2768 (1981), the hearing officer correctly ruled 
that it is improper for a party to insist upon the recording of 
negotiations. Determining, however, that CSEA did not do so, she concluded 
that there was no violation. The basis of this determination was that the 
County left the negotiations before any such insistence could have occurred. 
This overlooks the allegation in the charge that CSEA not only insisted 
upon tape recording the negotiating sessions, but that it also refused to 
remove the tape recorder. The mere fact that it brought the recorder to 
negotiations on October 16, after the County objected to its presence on 
a a 
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October 6, is sufficient to establish this allegation. Moreover, CSEA had 
sufficient opportunity on October 16 to inform the County that it was 
willing to turn off the tape recorder; it follows that it had sufficient 
opportunity to inform the County that it was willing to remove the tape 
recorder. It should have done so. The County's awareness of its presence 
could only give rise to concerns that would inhibit the negotiations. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Local 832 to cease and desist from refusing to 
negotiate in good faith with the County of Niagara by 
bringing, without the consent of the County, a 
recording device into a room where negotiations with 
the County of Niagara are taking place. 
DATED: September 22, 1982 
Albany, New York 
£?Abr7<i <*uir^tJ£ / V /fS-^TT^C^LAA. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
%t, W, '4U±^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, M^ember 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2F-9/22/82 
DEER PARK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5673 
-and-
DEER PARK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYEA/NEA, 
Charging Party. 
COOPER, ENGLANDER & SAPIR, P.C. (ROBERT E. SAPIR, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROBERT D. CLEARFIELD, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Deer Park Teachers 
Association, NYEA/NEA (Teachers Association) to a hearing officer's decision 
dismissing its charge that the Deer Park Union Free School District 
(District) violated §209-a.l(d) in that it made teaching assignments to 
directors. Underlying the charge is an assumption of the Teachers 
Association that teaching is exclusively the work of the employees of the 
District who are in cthe unit represented by the Teachers Association. The 
District's directors are not in that unit. They are supervisory employees 
of the District and are in a negotiating unit comprised of department 
chairmen and directors. 
Since 1975 the department chairmen and directors have been represented 
by the Deer Park Association of Chairman/Directors (Chairmen/Directors). 
Both the 1975-77 and 1977-78 agreements between the District and the 
Chairmen/Directors permitted department chairmen and directors to teach a 
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limited number of classes. Throughout this period, department chairmen were 
assigned the maximum number of classes permitted by the contract while the 
directors were assigned fewer classes than were permitted by the contract. 
The 1978-81 contract between the District and the Chairmen/Directors 
continued to permit the assignment of classes to department chairmen but 
precluded such assignments to directors. Pursuant to that contract, no 
director was assigned a class for two school years. However, the 1981-82 
contract between the District and the Chairmen/Directors once again 
authorized the assignment of a limited number of classes to directors and, 
acting pursuant to the contract, the District made such assignments.— 
In support of its exceptions, the Teachers Association argues that a 
new practice came into being during the period of September 1979 through 
June 1981 when directors were assigned no classes, and that the new practice 
constituted a benefit to classroom teachers in the unit that it 
represented. According to the Teachers Association, that benefit had become 
a term and condition of employment for classroom teachers which could not be 
altered by the District unilaterally. We do not agree with the Teachers 
Association. Teaching continued to constitute appropriate work for 
employees of the District in the Chairmen/Directors unit as well as in the 
teachers unit throughout the September 1979-June 1981 period. In part, this 
is evidenced by the assignment of classes to department chairmen. Even 
without such assignments, however, we would conclude that the contractual 
provision relieving directors from teaching assignments was a benefit 
temporarily obtained by the directors which imposed no obligation upon the 
District with respect to the classroom teachers, although it may incidently 
have benefited the teachers. 
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2/ NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing officer,—' and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: September 22, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Kiaus, Member 
kJ<£^ 
David C. Randies, Membe 
Board - U-5673 -4 
FOOTNOTES 
1/ The District laid off two teachers. The hearing officer determined 
that the number of classroom assignments to Directors was not 
sufficient to affect the jobs of the teachers. The record supports his 
determination. 
2/ Compare Ellenyille CSD, 13 PERB 1(3062 (1980) in which we held that a 
school district did not change any practice when it subcontracted bus 
runs_for the transportation ofhandicappedchildren_ during the summer 
because there was no established practice of using only unit employees 
to provide summer transportation for handicapped students. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2G-9/22/82 
In the Matter of 
AUBURN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, 
Employer, 
CASE NO. C-2313 
-and-
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 506, 
Petitioner. 
EDWARD A. O'HARA, III, ESQ., for Employer 
ROCCO A. DE PERNO, ESQ. (GEORGE C. MURAD, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Auburn Industrial 
Development Authority (Authority) to a decision of the Acting Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Acting Director) that two 
maintenance employees whom Teamsters Local Union 506 (Teamsters) are seeking 
to organize are employees of the Authority. The Authority asserts that the 
record does not support the Acting Director's conclusion. Rather, according 
to the Authority, the evidence is inconclusive and does not establish 
whether the maintenance workers are independent contractors, employees of 
the Authority, employees of a private sector company called Trimbec Temps, 
Inc., or employees of a joint employer composed of the Authority and 
Trimbec. The Authority argues that the matter must therefore be remanded 
for the development of a more complete record. 
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Having reviewed the record, we determine that there is sufficient 
evidence to support the conclusion of the Acting Director that the two 
maintenance workers are employees of the Authority. 
The employment of King, the senior maintenance worker, commenced before 
the Authority had assumed responsibility for the operation of the industrial 
complex which he maintains, but that Rossman, the junior maintenance worker, 
was hired by the office of the mayor of Auburn, the mayor being the chairman 
of the Authority. King and Rossman have been given little supervision. 
They know the general nature of their work and they perform it. However, 
specific tasks are assigned to them by the mayor's office and by tenants, 
but never by Trimbec. Trimbec's responsibility is to pay King and Rossman, 
and to facilitate this, King and Rossman report their time to Trimbec. 
Trimbec is reimbursed for these salaries by the Authority. It is to the 
mayor's office, however, and not to Trimbec, that they submit a daily report 
on work performed. The mayor's office handles their complaints and 
grievances and approves their time off. King's health insurance, which is 
the only fringe benefit shown by the record, is paid by the mayor's office. 
There is no record evidence of who exercises disciplinary authority over the 
maintenance workers, as neither King nor Rossman has ever been disciplined. 
On these facts, we affirm the decision of the Acting Director that the 
workers who maintain the industrial complex of the Authority are employees 
of the Authority. As they are the only employees of the Authority, we 
affirm his determination that they constitute a negotiating unit. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that an election by secret ballot be held 
under the supervision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation among the 
employees in such unit who were employed on the payroll 
date immediately preceding the date of this decision 
unless the Teamsters submit to him within 15 days from 
the date of receipt of this decision evidence to 
satisfy the requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules 
of this Board for certification without an election. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Authority shall submit 
to the Director and to the Teamsters within ten days of 
receipt of this decision a list of all employees 
currently within the unit determined to be appropriate 
who were employed on the payroll date immediately 
preceding the date of this decision. 
DATED: September 22, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
<Z$LA, J(JU*-<-<2^' 
Ida Klaus , Member 
£fe 
David C. Randies , Merooer 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
//2H-9/22/82 
ALBANY COUNTY, ALBANY COUNTY SHERIFF and 
ALBANY COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSN., INC., 
Respondents, 
CASE NO. U-5762 
-and-
SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO AND 
ALBANY COUNTY SHERIFF'S LOCAL 775, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Parties. 
HINMAN, STRAUB, PIGORS & MANNING, P.C. 
(BERNARD J. MALONE, JR., ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Respondent Albany County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association 
ROBERT G. LYMAN, ESQ., for Respondents, 
Albany County and Albany County Sheriff 
ROWLEY, FORREST AND O'DONNELL, P.C. 
(RONALD G. DUNN, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Charging Parties 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the charging parties to a 
hearing officer's decision dismissing their charge. 
At the time the charge was filed, Albany County Sheriff's Local 775, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 775) represented a unit of Sheriff's Department 
employees consisting of correction officers, matrons and deputy 
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sheriffs.— A petition had been filed by the Albany County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association, Inc. (Association) seeking a separate unit of deputy 
sheriffs. The petition was pending before the Director. 
On November 5, 1981, a memorandum from the President of the Association 
addressed to the deputy sheriffs and correction officers was posted on the 
various employee bulletin boards. In it, he claimed that the County 
Attorney had agreed to sign a contract with both unions which would result 
in retroactive pay raises. He took credit for expediting the pay raises. 
The charge, filed on November 12, 1981, against the joint employer and 
the Association, alleged that the joint employer had been refusing to 
negotiate in good faith and that it and the Association conspired to post 
the memorandum in order to undermine the charging parties and interfere with 
the rights of unit employees. 
On November 30, 1981, the joint employer entered into a memorandum of 
agreement with the charging parties for a contract to replace the one that 
had expired on December 31, 1980. On December 1, 1981, the joint employer 
entered into a memorandum of agreement with the Association approving the 
agreement entered into with the charging parties. 
At the pre-hearing conference, held on December 14, 1981, the attorney 
for the charging parties stated that the only evidence in support of the 
charge was the memorandum, which was attached to the charge. The hearing 
officer therefore decided that a hearing was not necessary and authorized 
the submission of briefs. The charging parties submitted a brief. 
In his decision, issued on April 28, 1982, the hearing officer dismissed 
the charge, concluding as to the joint employers that there was no evidence 
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connecting them with the issuance or posting of the memorandum. With 
respect to the Association, the hearing officer found that the memorandum 
was "substantially accurate and, at worst, electioneering puffery", which 
2/ Local 775 could have counteracted by posting its own notice.— 
The essence of the charging parties exceptions is that the hearing 
officer erred in not conducting a hearing. They assert that if a hearing 
were held, they would have proved that at a negotiating session on 
November 23, 1981 (after the filing of the charge), the employer proposed to 
sign a separate agreement with the Association. 
Having reviewed the record, we determine that it supports the hearing 
officer's decision. The only evidence in support of the charge was the 
posted memorandum. An inference cannot be drawn from this evidence that 
either joint employer was involved in the issuance or posting of the 
memorandum. The alleged later action of the employers, on November 23, 
1981, cannot be evidence of their complicity in the posting of the 
memorandum on November 5, 1981. While it might be the basis for a separate 
charge or an amendment to the original charge, neither was filed. 
Consequently, the hearing officer committed no error in not conducting a 
hearing. 
With respect to the dismissal of the charge against the Association, we 
conclude that the hearing officer correctly described the memorandum to be 
"at worst, electioneering puffery", which could have been counteracted by 
the charging parties. 
Moreover, as we read the exceptions, none of them address the dismissal 
of the charge against the Association. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing officer, and WE 
ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
September 22, 1982 
^^V/~—«^t C?^t--i 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
iC&u^L^-
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C 
a * wv 
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FOOTNOTES 
1/ While the charge alleges that Council 82 and Local 775 are joint 
representatives, the record indicates that only Local 775 has been 
recognized by the employer. 
2/ The hearing officer noted in his decision that on January 27, 1982, the 
Board had dismissed the Association's petition. (County of Albany, 15 PERB 
1(3008 [1982]) - - --.. . 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #21-9/22/82 
PORT JEFFERSON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
CASE NO. U-5713 
-and-
UNITED AIDES AND ASSISTANTS ASSOCIATION OF 
PORT JEFFERSON, 
Charging Party. 
ANTHONY P. DI ROCCO, for Respondent 
RICHARD L. NEWCOMB, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the United Aides and 
Assistants Association of Port Jefferson (Association) to a hearing 
officer's decision dismissing a charge that it filed against the Port 
Jefferson Union Free School District (District). The charge alleges that 
the District committed an improper practice when Roth, an elementary school 
principal, sent a memorandum to Ebetino, the superintendent of schools, a 
copy of which was sent to Braun, the Association's president, which 
complains that Braun had circumvented proper procedures in handling the 
complaints of three unit employees. Roth's memorandum, which was written in 
response to an inquiry by Ebetino, recommended that a unit employee who has 
a complaint should first be required to raise the complaint with his 
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immediate supervisor and that the Association ought not be brought in unless 
the immediate supervisor cannot or will not resolve the problem. Neither 
Roth nor anyone else in the District took any steps to effectuate Roth's 
recommendation. 
The hearing officer ruled that Roth's memorandum to Ebetino merely 
constituted an expression of opinion and was not an improper practice under 
the Taylor Law. In its exceptions, the Association argues that every 
written criticism of an employee is a reprimand. Thus, according to the 
Association, Braun was reprimanded because she engaged in the protected 
activity of representing unit employees. 
We reject the Association's thesis that every written criticism of an 
employee is a reprimand. Whether or not a criticism, oral or written, is a 
reprimand depends upon its contents and the circumstances of its issuance. 
In the matter before us, we conclude that Roth's internal memorandum was not 
a reprimand. Written in response to an inquiry from Ebetino, it was a 
criticism of procedures followed by Braun and a recommendation that 
alternative procedures be adopted.— While a copy of the memorandum was 
sent to Braun for her own information, it was not otherwise publicized 
throughout the unit. We find no indication that it constituted a reprisal 
or a threat of reprisal for Braun's activities on behalf of the 
Association. Neither do we find its tenor or content to have been designed 
to, nor did it interfere with or coerce Braun in her activities on behalf of 
the Association. 
1/ As it was not adopted, neither the wisdom nor the propriety of the 
procedure proposed by Roth is placed in issue in this matter. The sole 
question concerns Roth's right to make such a recommendation to Ebetino 
and to notify Braun of her recommendation. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the hearing officer, and 
WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby 
is, DISMISSED. 
DATED: September 22, 1982 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
3?u_ Alt* 
Ida Klaus, Member 
VstL &V~> 
David C. Randies, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN, 
Employer, 
-and-
TRUCK DRIVERS AND HELPERS, TEAMSTERS 
LOCAL UNION 687, 
Petitioner 
-and-
FRANKLIN COUNTY UNIT OF THE CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Truck Drivers and Helpers, 
Teamsters Local Union 687 has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotia-
tions and the settlement of grievances. 
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C a s e No. C - 2 4 6 0 
Certification - C-2460 page 2 
Unit: Included: All employees of the County of Franklin. 
Excluded: All full time and regular part time Sheriff's 
Department employees and the following 
employees: all elected officials, Clerk to 
the Board of Legislators, Secretary to the 
Board of Legislators, County Clerk, District 
AttorheyV Ass1 sTaht Distr1ct Attdrney, Specia1 
Assistant to District Attorney, Secretary to 
District Attorney, Public Defender, Assistant 
Public Defender, Secretary to Public Defender, 
Auditor, Purchasing Agent, Budget Officer, 
Assistant Budget Officer/Principal Account 
Clerk, Deputy Auditor, County Treasurer, 
Deputy County Treasurer, Director of Real 
Property Taxes, Deputy County Clerk, County 
Attorney, Assistant County Attorney, Secretary 
to County Attorney, Personnel Officer, 
Commissioner of the Board of Election, Deputy 
Commissioner of the Board of Election, 
Superintendent of Buildings § Grounds, 
Director of Data Processing, County Sheriff, 
Director of Probation, Probation Supervisor, 
Undersheriff, Fire Coordinator, Director of 
Civil Defense, Director of Patient Services, 
Assistant Supervising Public Health Nurse, 
Drug Abuse Coordinator, Alcoholism Services 
Coordinator, Director of Mental Health 
Administration, Commmissioner of Social 
Services, Social Services Attorney, Principal 
Social Welfare Examiner, Social Services 
Accounting Supervisor, Case Supervisor - Grade 
B, Coordinator of Child Support Enforcement, 
Staff Development Coordinator, Senior 
Caseworker - Medical Unit, Superintendent Wm. 
W. Mansion Nursing Home, Medical Director, 
Physicians, Director of Nursing, Pharmacist, 
Coordinator of Manpower, Assistant Employment 
§ Training Director II, Director of Veterans 
Services Agency, Assistant Director of 
Veterans Services Agency, Self Insurance 
Administrator, Director of Office for the 
Aging, Youth Bureau Director, Director of 
Winterization Program, Planning Assistant of 
Environmental § Financial Planning, Super-
intendent of Highway, Assistant Superintendent 
of Highway/Accounting Supervisor, County 
Sealer of Weights and Measures. 
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Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Truck Drivers and Helpers, 
Teamsters Local Union 687 and enter into written agreement with 
such employee organization with regard to terms and conditions of 
employment, and shall negotiate collectively with such employee 
organization in the determination of, and administration of, 
grievances-
Signed on the 21st day of September, 1982 
Albany, New York 
' ' Harold R. Ne wman, Chairman 
<3z?-du /C^s-^-<-^—" 
Ida K l a u s , Member 
David C. Rand ies , /Member 
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